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ABSTRACT In the practical study of cybersecurity, students benefit greatly from having full control of
physical equipment and services. However, this presents far too great a risk to security to be permitted on
university campus networks. This paper describes an approach, used successfully at Northumbria University,
in which students have control of an off-campus network laboratory, with a dedicated connection to the
Internet. The laboratory is flexible enough to allow the teaching of general purpose networking and operating
systems courses, while also supporting the teaching of cybersecurity through the safe integration of honeypot
devices. In addition, the paper gives an analysis of honeypot architectures and presents two in detail. One of
these offers students the opportunity to study cybersecurity attacks and defences at very low cost. It has been
developed as a stand-alone device that also can be integrated safely into the laboratory environment for the
study of more complex scenarios. The main contributions of this paper are the design and implementation
of: an off-campus, physical network laboratory; a small, low-cost, configurable platform for use as a “light-
weight” honeypot; and a laboratory-based, multi-user honeypot for large-scale, concurrent, cybersecurity
experiments. The paper outlines how the laboratory environment has been successfully deployed within a
university setting to support the teaching and learning of cybersecurity. It highlights the type of experiments
and projects that have been supported and can be supported in the future.
INDEX TERMS Cybersecurity, Network Security, Honeypot, Teaching
I. INTRODUCTION
When teaching cybersecurity in an academic environment,
there are many considerations that need to be taken into
account, not least respect for users’ privacy and their access
to learning and teaching facilities. Cybersecurity experiments
can result in traffic or services being deployed into the
network of the teaching environment in ways that may affect
other users, for example, through service depletion, traffic
redirection [1], [2], or unauthorised data capture. In the most
serious cases, the legal rights of other users may be vio-
lated. For these reasons, there are restrictions on the network
activities that are permitted on a typical university campus
network, designed for general student access. For example,
port security may be employed to prevent the attachment of
unauthorised equipment to the network, or firewalls may be
used to restrict outgoing / incoming traffic from the Internet.
Quite rightly, students are not allowed administrative privi-
leges to configure the computers and other devices attached
to the main campus network.
It is clear that these restrictions severely limit the kind of
work that can be undertaken in teaching real-world, practi-
cal cybersecurity skills, and the access to potentially useful
teaching resources [1], [3] that can be made available to stu-
dents. They also prevent the control over the network that is
required for the effects of attacks to be isolated and analysed
thoroughly. For example, in order to analyse the effects of an
attack on the throughput of a protocol, it may be necessary to
restrict other network activity, such as file transfers or service
advertising that may impact on the experimental environment
and invalidate the results. This is not possible on a main
campus network.
These issues highlight the need for a clear specification of
the requirements of a specialist network environment for the
study of cybersecurity. This is one of the key topics of this
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Another key topic is the role that can be played by hon-
eypots in providing a stimulating environment for students
to study practical aspects of cybersecurity. Honeypots are
computer systems designed specifically for cybersecurity
investigations [4], [5]. They exist in a variety of forms, e.g. as
a “lab-in-a-box” (LiaB) [6]; as a full network deployment,
incorporating switches, routers, and servers; as a simple
program running on a computer, or as a virtualised platform.
We classify honeypots in terms of the level of interaction and
analysis that they offer, and also in terms of the volume of
concurrent requests that they are able to process.
• Low Interaction: Implements coarse-grained services
and captures only a low-level of detail about their im-
plementation and their interaction with users. This type
of honeypot can also be used to act as an attractor for
bot-based attacks [7].
• High Interaction: Implements fine-grained services and
captures a high-level of detail about their implemen-
tation and their interaction with users. This type of
honeypot is called a “research” honeypot by Mairh et
al. [8]. High-interaction honeypots can also be used
to distract potential hackers from a genuine system (a
decoy) [9], [10].
• Low Volume: Capable of supporting only a small num-
ber of concurrent requests. This type honeypot is often
deployed in a research or teaching laboratory to investi-
gate the details of a single attack type.
• High Volume: Capable of supporting a large number
of concurrent requests. This type of honeypot is often
deployed in an environment that results in the honeypot
being subjected to high levels of usage from multiple
sources.
These two categories provide four different types of hon-
eypot based upon interaction and volume. We use the obvious
acronyms to refer to each different type, as shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Honeypot types by interaction and volume
Low Volume High Volume
Low Interaction LILV LIHV
High Interaction HILV HIHV
This paper focuses on Low-Interaction-High-Volume
(LIHV) and High-Interaction-Low-Volume (HILV) honey-
pots. The other two types of honeypot are less interesting, for
different reasons. On the one hand, a Low-Interaction-Low-
Volume (LILV) honeypot has limited utility. If required, its
functionality can be provided by an HILV honeypot, at no
significant extra cost. For example, an exercise in installing
and testing a tool such as Kippo [11] can be undertaken
with an HILV honeypot just as easily as with an LILV hon-
eypot. On the other hand, a High-Interaction-High-Volume
(HIHV) honeypot is expensive to deploy and time-consuming
to reconfigure for different teaching scenarios. This type
of honeypot is useful in a research environment, e.g. for
use in long term Internet-based projects, but is not required
for teaching a full range of practical cybersecurity skills at
undergraduate level.
The main finding of this paper is that a stimulating environ-
ment for teaching practical, real-world cybersecurity skills, in
a university setting, can be provided in a safe, cost-effective
manner using a combination of a flexible, general purpose,
network laboratory together with the sandboxed deployment
of LIHV and HILV honeypots.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II discusses
current research in approaches to teaching practical aspects
of cybersecurity. Section III outlines the requirements of a
flexible laboratory environment for teaching networking and
cybersecurity. Section IV classifies honeypot architectures
and discusses the two that we have found most useful for
the teaching of networking and cybersecurity. Section V
describes the design and implementation of a general purpose
networking laboratory, suitable for the safe deployment of
honeypots. Section VI discusses how the flexible laboratory
environment has been used at Northumbria University for
teaching networking and cybersecurity. Section VII con-
cludes and proposes further work for the development and
application of the laboratory for teaching and research.
II. RELATED WORK
There are many papers relating to the development and use
of honeypot technologies. These papers cover both physical
and virtual implementations, and their application to teaching
cybersecurity.
Romney and Lanoy [2], Hiber et al. [12], Wannous and
Nakano [13] and Marsa et al. [14] discuss the use of a
variety of virtual environments for the deployment of labora-
tory/honeypot platforms and networking architectures. In our
experience, virtualisation works well for network simulation
but limits the range of practical cybersecurity activities that
can be undertaken. The limitations extend to deployment, re-
source utilisation, and data capture. The main problems arise
because the resources in a virtual environment are shared. For
example, if multiple experiments are performed simultane-
ously in a laboratory based on VLAN technology, unexpected
results may be observed due to cross boundary effects. We
have seen a MAC flood experiment running on one VLAN
cause unexpected packet loss in another experiment running
at the same time on another VLAN. This can be caused
by exhaustion of a resource shared by VLANs using the
same switch, e.g. the switch’s MAC table or backplane. This
issue should cause concern to anyone considering performing
cybersecurity experiments on a VLAN connected to their
main university campus network.
Experiments in a virtual environment may breach a sand-
boxed virtual host, so impacting on other experiments. The
physical networking components of a virtual server are often
shared across the virtual hosts even though the hosts use
virtualised addresses. Again, this can produce unexpected
results when experiments are executed simultaneously. When
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conducting remote attack experiments, the network capture
capabilities are also complicated by virtualisation, due to the
mixture of traffic from multiple experiments. For example,
a simple reconnaissance scan of a network can compromise
other experiments.
Although it is often possible to propose a solution to any
particular problem caused by the sharing of resources, it
is very difficult to be confident that one has considered all
such problems that may arise when using a virtual envi-
ronment. Having said that, we do often use virtualisation
to add resources to our physical architecture, but only in
circumstances where the sharing of the virtualised resources
can be carefully controlled.
Abler et al. [15] describe a more independent, hardware-
based environment for cybersecurity experiments, but their
environment still relies on VLAN technologies and requires a
large number of routers, switches and servers. Their environ-
ment is configurable but it seems that experiments involving
attacks on network infrastructure could cause problems for
multiple, simultaneous users.
Salah et al. [16] propose the use of cloud services such as
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) for the deployment of
configurable environments for cybersecurity. However many
of the issues relating to virtualisation are reflected in this
approach. In addition, the usage agreements for the EC2
platform places restrictions on what can be done in this
environment. Section 6 of the Customer Agreement states
that the service could be suspended if “. . . your or an End
User’s use of the Service Offerings (i) poses a security risk to
the Service Offerings or any third party, (ii) could adversely
impact our systems, the Service Offerings or the systems or
Content of any other AWS customer” [17].
Lee et al. [18] discuss an approach based on a simple
physical LAN, with multiple clients and servers located on
a subnet. Their environment is very popular for cybersecurity
competitions in which teams can compete in activities such
as capture-the-flag or time trials. The environment provides
limited access to network traffic, which compromises its
effectiveness as a tool for the analysis of specific attacks,
but it does provide users with a platform for trying out
attacks, usually using well-established tool sets, such as those
provided by Kali Linux [19]. This type of platform works
well for events such as those organised by the Cyber Se-
curity Challenge UK organisation [20] where cybersecurity
is treated as a competitive activity rather than a topic for
detailed investigation.
The low cost of the HILV honeypots described in this
paper enable us to extend the multi-honeypot experimental
environments discussed by Duffany [22], since it becomes
affordable to increase the number of available honeypots for
distributed data capture. Our HILV design also produces a
honeypot that is small enough to be portable, and therefore
easily deployed in different locations, not only the laboratory
but even a student’s home environment.
In comparison with other approaches, we have found that
the integration of HILV honeypots with an LIHV honeypot in
a dedicated network laboratory gives a highly configurable,
cost-effective, safe environment for running many different
networking and cybersecurity projects and activities. For
example, our environment is capable of investigating all of
the attack techniques discussed by Spitner [21], as well as
many others.
III. LABORATORY REQUIREMENTS
This section discusses the main requirements of the honeypot
technologies and the general purpose network laboratory for
the delivery of networking and cybersecurity modules. The
teaching environment consists of three distinct components:
the small scale HILV honeypots (requirements 1,2,3,4,5), the
LIHV honeypot (requirement 6), and the general purpose
networking laboratory (requirements 7,8).
A. HILV HONEYPOT
Requirement 1: The HILV honeypot must allow students:
to deploy basic networking services on multiple low-cost
servers (e.g. DHCP/DNS/HTTP/DB); to attack these services;
and to capture and analyse the details of the network traffic
and server events that are generated.
Requirement 2: In order to satisfy Requirement 1, while
protecting the rest of the laboratory from the effects of
attacks, there needs to be a mechanism that allows students
to connect their servers to the general networking laboratory
via port mapping or address forwarding.
Requirement 3: The servers need to have limited hardware
resources in order to allow the analysis of resource exhaus-
tion attacks without requiring a large number of attacking
end points, e.g. it should be possible to launch a successful
resource exhaustion attack from a botnet consisting of a few
machines rather than hundreds or thousands.
Requirement 4: The honeypot must provide scope for addi-
tional services and devices to be added. It must also provide
the ability to cascade multiple honeypots to create a hon-
eynet [23]–[25].
Requirement 5: The honeypot must facilitate effective net-
work traffic capture to ensure the integrity of any network
analysis e.g. identifying network transactions in a website
defacement or denial of service (DoS or DDoS) attack, or
spoofed packets in ARP poisoning for man-in-the-middle
(MitM) attacks [26], [27].
B. LIHV HONEYPOT
Requirement 6: There needs to be a facility that allows large
numbers of students to test existing cybersecurity tools and
to provide them with the ability to develop and test their own
tools.
C. GENERAL NETWORKING LABORATORY
Requirement 7: There must be a flexible, reconfigurable,
base laboratory environment, isolated from the main uni-
versity campus network, for students to carry out their nor-
mal studies of networks, operating systems and network
services. Students require administrative access to the basic
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networking equipment such as routers, switches, and desktop
machines for installation and configuration of general pur-
pose tools and virtual environments. These activities would
normally be prohibited on a university campus network [14].
This is the case at Northumbria University, although lim-
ited access is provided to staff rooms via campus VLAN
connections. However, these connections are to be phased
out in 2018. There also needs to be a facility to deploy a
standard software environment to all devices with minimal
administrative intervention.
Requirement 8: The laboratory network should implement a
security policy, independent of the standard university policy,
controlling access to the Internet. This is to allow students to
access security sites and relevant software packages. Many
academic networks block access to cybersecurity tool sites
from their specialist and general access laboratories [1],
[3], as well as from the open access areas used by stu-
dents. Tools such a Metasploit [28] or the Kali Linux
distribution [19] are usually blocked, as are cybersecurity
information sites such as http://www.hak5.org or
https://www.exploit-db.com/. It must be possible
to lift these restrictions in a laboratory supporting cyber-
security studies.
IV. HONEYPOT ARCHITECTURES
As shown in Table 1, we consider four types of honeypot
architecture.
• LILV This type of honeypot is used when a basic testing
platform is required to identify how a service is being at-
tacked but no other interactions need to be investigated.
For example, a software system, such as Kippo [11],
can be studied to discover how it logs transactions to a
file or a database.
• LIHV This type of honeypot is used when carrying
out analysis of a high volume of service requests while
capturing only a limited amount of service and system
activity data, e.g. when analysing multiple concurrent
authentication attacks on an FTP server by investigating
only the service log files. This type of honeypot can
also be used in a general purpose networking laboratory
with students to allow them to investigate authentication
tools such as Hydra and xHydra [29] and to be a target
when they are developing their own tools such as an
authentication-based botnet.
• HILV This type of honeypot is used when there is a
low volume of service requests but fine-grained data
capture is required. For example, when investigating
a DNS enumeration attack, a single AXFR [30] query
may be the only service request required to initiate the
attack, but the effect of this query, and the high-level of
activity it generates, can be captured in great detail. A
similar example is the profiling of a Wordpress [31]
site using WPScan [32].
• HIHV This type of honeypot is used when a system is
being thoroughly tested with a high volume of service
requests (pressure testing) and involves large numbers
of high-powered servers capable of supporting high lev-
els of concurrent interactions. These honeypots provide
detailed data capture capabilities of all the services and
the inter-service interactions as well as system transac-
tions e.g. SQL queries and responses. They are usually
deployed as “real” systems for penetration testing and
are often exposed to the Internet to analyse the effects
of unsolicited attacks.
The two types of honeypot deployed in the laboratory are
HILV and LIHV. These are now presented in more detail.
A. HILV HONEYPOT
The HILV honeypot architecture provides an isolated envi-
ronment that can be connected to the main laboratory infra-
structure in a controlled way using a commercially available
cable router, as shown in Fig. 1.
Figures 2 and 3 shows the complete device as deployed
in the specialist teaching laboratories. The complete HILV
honeypot consists of:
• A router for traffic management to and from the labo-
ratory infrastructure via NAT and address forwarding.
(connected via the green cable).
• 4 Raspberry Pi boards [33] for service deployment.
• A managed switch for packet capture:
– 1 port (port 8) setup as a monitor usually connected
to a PC running TCPDump or Wireshark (red
cable).
– All other ports are mirrored to the monitor (ports
1–7).
– 1 port (port 7) links the switch and router.
– 4 ports (ports 1–4) are connected to the 4 Raspberry
Pi servers.
– 2 spare ports (ports 5,6) are available for additional
services, clients, or devices to be added (blue ca-
bles).
The two additional devices shown in Fig. 1 could be
PCs acting as attack entry points or victims. These devices
could also be PCs supporting virtualisation to extend the
honeypot’s functionality.
The use of Raspberry Pi boards as the main servers for
the honeypot simplifies reconfiguration and rebuilding of the
architecture. The operating system (and configured services)
are stored on removable media (micro SD cards) which
simplifies server recovery and the maintenance of multiple
configurations. Images of the honeypot’s base configuration
can easily be restored. Multiple configurations can be kept on
different image sets and students can keep individual projects
as a set of micro SD cards that they retain for the duration of
a project.
The approximate cost of the basic HILV honeypot, without
additional devices or the monitoring PC attached, is ≈£300
a breakdown of the costs is shown in Table 2. This offers a
highly stimulating environment for the teaching of practical
cybersecurity skills at a very low cost.
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FIGURE 1. HILV honeypot overview
FIGURE 2. HILV honeypot side view FIGURE 3. HILV honeypot top view
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TABLE 2. HILV Costs
Product Quantity Unit Cost Total
TP Link TL-SG108E 8 port switch 1 £29.99 £29.99
Raspberry Pi 3 4 £33.00 £132.00
Raspberry Pi PSU 4 £8.89 £35.56
TP Link TL-R470T+ Cable Router 1 £34.99 £34.99
Ethernet cables 1m (3 Pack) 1 £15.31 £15.31
Ethernet cables 0.25m (5 pack) 1 £8.56 £8.56
Masterplug 6 socket extension 1 £16.99 £16.99
Perspex Fabrication 1 £30.00 £30.00
£303.40
Address Range Support: The HILV honeypot environment
must reside on a different subnet from the main laboratory
network in order for the double NAT’d configuration to
function correctly. This is achieved by assigning a private
class A IP address block, providing more than 16 million
addresses.
Router Configuration: The HILV honeypot’s ADSL router is
configured to provide only routing services by disabling all
other services, e.g. NAS and DHCP facilities. This configura-
tion allows all infrastructure protocols to be managed from
within the honeypot using small-scale servers (Raspberry Pi
boards). Configuring the services on separate servers allows
analysis of inter-service activity during normal network ac-
tivity and during an attack.
A low-cost router such as a TP Link TL-R470T+ [34]
is adequate for use in the HILV honeypot. The router is con-
figured to use the laboratory-based DHCP server to acquire
an address. The IP address is allocated from a reservation
which allows a consistent mapping of the forwarded IP
address from the Internet-based router to the HILV honeypot
router. Defining the mapping in this way allows external host
names (URLs) to be mapped to the honeypot for Internet-
based attack analysis. Forwarding of traffic from the router
into the honeypot can be enabled and disabled when required.
For direct access to the honeypot from the laboratory, IP
forwarding is configured to “point” to a target machine within
the honeypot, as shown in Fig. 4. In small-scale routers, this
operation is normally referred to as a DMZ (demilitarised
zone) redirection [35].
Switch Configuration: A key component of the HILV hon-
eypot is a commercially available, 8-port, managed switch.
The switch supports layer 2 management [36] to provide
two specific technologies: port mirroring and port throttling.
Suitable switches include HP 2530-08 [37], TP-LINK
TL-SG2008 [38], and TP Link TL-SG108E [39]. The
combination of port mirroring and port throttling provides a
reliable architecture for packet capture.
Port mirroring: Switches maintain an in-memory table of
ports and MAC addresses to support the efficient delivery of
frames. This ensures that packets are transferred port to port
rather than being broadcast (port to port communications are
known as “virtual circuits”). This technology complicates the
process of packet capture. When using a honeypot, packet
capture is a vital part of the architecture for the analysis of
any network-based attack vector. Using a managed switch (as
discussed above), it is possible to configure the ports on the
switch to be mirrored to a specific port, as shown in Figs. 1
and 5. This allows all the network activity to be captured and
analysed (Requirement 8). Switches can implement mirroring
in one of two ways. Firstly, a monitor-only port can be
provided, where the transmission capability of the port is
removed, (as in the case of an HP 1810-G). This type of
configuration prevents the monitoring device from adding
traffic to the network. Alternatively, some manufacturers
configure the mirroring port to offer full transmit/receive
functionality, in addition to the mirroring capability (as in
the case of a TP-SG108E). This allows the attached monitor
to also be used as a device within the honeypot. If the monitor
port provides full functionality, the addition of a LAN tap [40]
can remove the transmission facilities of the port, creating
monitor-only functionality when required, as shown in Fig. 1.
Bandwidth throttling: A further issue with the capture of the
honeypot network traffic is the possibility of frame loss on
the port to which the mirrored traffic is forwarded. Switches
are designed to provide maximum transfer speed between
ports. This is achieved through the switch’s backplane. If
the throughput of traffic on the mirrored ports exceeds the
bandwidth of the port to which the traffic is mirrored, then
frame loss at this port is inevitable. To prevent this occurring,
the switch must be configured to throttle the throughput on
the mirrored ports so as not to overwhelm the backplane.
Figure 5 shows the basic configuration of a throttled environ-
ment. The port which has the frames forwarded to it must be
configured to run at a speed that exceeds the total bandwidth
of the mirrored ports. The effect of this is that as frames are
transferred between ports, they are reliably replicated via the
backplane to the monitor port. This configuration satisfies
requirement 8.
Internet Support: Access to the Internet from the honeypot
is possible through the double NAT’d configuration. This
configuration provides isolation from the laboratory and the
Internet. External response to a service request from a device
in the honeypot is achieved through packet forwarding, as
shown in Fig. 4. For this technique to function correctly
the laboratory network and honeypot network must be on
different subnets.
The Internet facility also supports IP address forwarding
to allow Internet-based access into the honeypot. From the
Internet, packets are forwarded to the address of a honeypot
router which, in turn, forwards traffic to a target machine
inside the honeypot, as shown in Fig. 4.
This configuration allows specific configurations to be
exposed in order to capture Internet-based attacks and to sup-
port remote access to the honeypot for remote configuration
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FIGURE 4. Address/Port forwarding
FIGURE 5. Port throttling
and monitoring.
B. LIHV HONEYPOT
The LIHV honeypot is not intended for use in a reconfig-
urable environment and does not require any monitoring or
control of the network. No port monitoring or throttling is
required and all activity monitoring is achieved using log
files. The log files are made available for analysis of service-
based access activity via a web-link.
The LIHV honeypot is a single 1U LAMP server (HPE
ProLiant DL360 Gen9 Server [41] costing approx
£2000), located in a separate cabinet, shown in Fig. 6. The
cabinet is secured to prevent students having direct access
to the hardware. It supports the general honeypot service
to provide students with a platform to carry out simple
authentication attacks using tools such as Hydra from within
the Kali Linux [19] tool set. This honeypot also provides
a target for the development of bespoke authentication attack
tools in the final year undergraduate cybersecurity modules.
FIGURE 6. LIHV honeypot overview
This server is accessed directly in the laboratory, or via the
Internet, as a bastion server [42]. This allows access from
within the laboratory, but also from outside the laboratory to
support directed learning tasks and also to support collabora-
tive ventures.
V. GENERAL NETWORKING LABORATORY
A. OVERVIEW
The flexible laboratory environment comprises a secured
communications cabinet, several open-access, teaching cab-
inets, and benches with desktop PCs for student use. The
physical networking layer between devices is reconfigurable.
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This is achieved by the use of a structured cabling archi-
tecture (Fig. 7). Internet access is provided by cascading
each cabinet’s “internet switch” to the central communication
cabinet’s “internet switch”. A logical view of the internet
facilities is shown in Fig. 8.
The communications cabinet is secured; students are not
allowed access to it, in order to prevent them from recon-
figuring the base network and the network services equip-
ment. Figure 9 shows the main infrastructure cabling within
the communications cabinet. The cabinet also contains the
primary DHCP and DNS servers, a 1U intranet server, a
database server and a NAS drive as shown in Fig. 10. It also
includes a VDSL fibre link from the ISP. In the case of
Northumbria University, the provider is BT Business [43].
A Draytek Vigor 2850 [44] router is used to manage
the ISP connection.
Students have unrestricted access to the other cabinets,
each of which is linked to a laboratory bench supporting 8–
10 students, These cabinets contain a selection of switches,
routers, IP telephony, IDS, and firewall equipment that is
required for general computer networking modules, as shown
in Fig. 11. They are linked back to the communications
cabinet to provide internet access for the benches. Access to
the internet from the desktop is achieved through a NAT con-
nection from the ISP router in the communications cabinet.
The structured cabling allows the resources of each cabinet
within the laboratory to be linked to the desktop through
structured cabling ports. Cross-cabinet connections ensure
specialist resources are flexibly available to all benches e.g.
switches, routers, firewalls, and IDS (Intrusion Detection
Systems) etc.
B. ADDRESS RANGE SUPPORT
The use of virtualisation at the desktop (GNS3 [45],
VMWare [46] and VirtualBox [47]), to support operat-
ing systems and networking modules, requires enough host
addresses to support a large number of students deploying
statically addressed virtual hosts. The base laboratory net-
work infrastructure is configured as a single class B subnet.
This provides 65,534 addresses, which is more than enough
for each student to be allocated a block of contiguous IP
addresses for each module, allowing multiple modules to be
delivered concurrently without having IP address conflicts.
This approach also allows equipment to be moved around in
the laboratory without requiring address reconfiguration.
C. NETWORK SERVICE DEPLOYMENT
To support the study of operating systems and other gen-
eral computing subjects, the network requires, as a min-
imum, DNS [48] and DHCP [49] services. These services
are deployed across three small-scale, 1U servers (HPE
ProLiant DL360 Gen9 Server [41]). Two servers
are located in the communications cabinet as shown in Fig. 7.
One server supports DHCP and DNS, which are integrated to
create a DDNS [50] environment. The second server acts as
the secondary DNS server. The third server is located in the
LIHV honeypot cabinet and acts as a further secondary DNS
server. The communications cabinet also contains a 1U server
that provides the laboratory intranet (LAMP based) service,
along with general purpose MySQL database services for the
intranet and module content delivery.
Deployment of known desktop equipment is coordinated
by creating reservation entries in the DHCP service. The
DHCP server then automatically creates the forward and
reverse DNS entries in the DNS architecture as the equipment
boots. Students can also connect their own devices which are
allocated a network configuration from a DHCP address pool.
D. TEACHING FACILITIES SUPPORT
Teaching of standard technologies, such as switching and
routing, use the physical equipment within the cabinets.
The laboratory also supports network virtualisation through
GNS3, which can be integrated with the physical equipment
when necessary. The teaching of the OS-based technolo-
gies is supported through the use of desktop virtualisation,
allowing each student to have multiple clients and servers
running simultaneously on a single machine. For large-scale
scenarios, which are required on some modules, the virtual
machines may be deployed across several desktop machines.
These large scale deployments require the virtualisation soft-
ware to support network card bridging to allow the virtual
machines to be “physically” connected to the laboratory
infrastructure. Subjects that require a laboratory “search-by-
name” facility (DNS and rDNS) such as Java sockets and C
sockets programming are supported by the DDNS implemen-
tation as discussed in Sect. V-C.
VI. EXPERIENCE OF LABORATORY USE IN TEACHING
The general laboratory infrastructure has been in place, and
actively used, for 10 years. The LIHV honeypot has been in
place for 9 years. The honeypot was developed to support a
cybersecurity module on an undergraduate networking pro-
gramme and has been used successfully in the teaching of
basic attack vectors such as port analysis, banner grabbing
and service interaction (FTP and HTTP) both for taught
modules and student projects.
The HILV honeypots were designed and built 6 years ago
and have been used since 2012 (5 years) on undergraduate
networking and cybersecurity programmes. They have been
deployed in activities such as service redirection attacks, am-
plification attacks and man-in-the-middle scenarios. The use
of Raspberry Pi boards in the HILV honeypots has allowed
diverse subjects to be taught more easily due to their use of
removable media to store the operating system. The setup
time for laboratories and teaching sessions has been signif-
icantly reduced, in comparison with our previous approach
of using small clusters of PC’s with removable drives. This
is reflected in the students’ response to the configuration of
the HILV honeypot, as discussed in section VI-D. There have
been several hardware changes to the HILV honeypots over
this time but the basic architecture has remained unchanged.
The latest change involved an upgrade from Raspberry Pi 2 to
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FIGURE 7. General networking laboratory overview
FIGURE 8. Logical view of internet access
Raspberry Pi 3. The cost of layer 2 switches and their avail-
ability has also improved and they are now more affordable.
As new honeypots are fabricated, TP-LINK switches are
being used in preference to the more expensive HP switches.
The TP-LINK switches do not provide a fully implemented
monitor port; this requires the inclusion of a network tap as
shown in Fig. 1.
A. SUPPORTED TEACHING
The current implementation of the laboratory supports >200
students. This includes undergraduates studying networking
(≈40) and cybersecurity (≈150), and postgraduates studying
networking (≈20). Each of our programmes is delivered in
modules. A typical undergraduate programme runs around 10
modules concurrently e.g. networking technology (years 1, 2,
3 & 4 with MComp), security case projects (Year 2), sock-
ets programming (year 3). Each module requires ≈3 hours
contact per week and ≈3 hours of directed learning, which
may require laboratory time. In addition, the laboratory sup-
FIGURE 9. Communications cabinet
ports many undergraduate and postgraduate cybersecurity
projects (≈80), including cyber attack analysis and general
cybersecurity research such as biometric-based, multi-factor
authentication and IoT (Internet of Things) security projects.
B. SUPPORTED MODULES
All network engineering modules, across both undergraduate
and postgraduate programmes, involving routing, switching,
VLAN deployment, MPLS networking and IP telephony are
successfully taught using the general networking laboratory
infrastructure.
Network service deployment, using server operating sys-
tems (Windows and Linux), for both undergraduate and
postgraduate programmes, is taught successfully in the en-
vironment using virtual machine technologies. The network
service deployments include load-balanced HTTP, network
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FIGURE 10. Communications cabinet servers
FIGURE 11. General networking laboratory cabinet
file system deployments (NFS and SMB), replication based
MySQL services and large scale DNS deployments.
The HILV honeypot environment has allowed aspects of
network-based infrastructure, specifically broadcast network
services, to be taught as a practical implementation rather
than only as a simulation, and has allowed students to develop
complete network infrastructures integrated to the Internet.
Cybersecurity modules are predominantly taught using the
HILV honeypots, particularly when looking at attack vectors
that require packet spoofing or resource exhaustion through
the volume of traffic generation.
The HILV honeypots have also allowed analysis of live
attacks from the Internet without impacting on the local lab-
oratory network. Activities such as port scanning are passed
through directly to the HILV honeypot, without exposing the
laboratory infrastructure. The use of multiple HILV honey-
pots has allowed profiles of subnet scanning and attacks to be
analysed by students, providing them with a rich environment
for experimentation and analysis.
C. SUPPORTED PROJECTS
The HILV honeypots have been available for several years
now and students who move to the final year of the
cybersecurity undergraduate programme tend to carry out
research-based projects. Usually these involve the use of
the basic HILV honeypot, but some projects add additional
components to the honeypot such as firewalls (pfSense [51]
or ipFire [52]) or wireless access points for the analysis of
smartphone or tablet-based application attacks. A sample of
recent projects is described below.
• Multi-Tiered defence analysis of a simulated cyber at-
tack. This project involved configuring the HILV hon-
eypots to support an IPFire (software based firewall
technology), and investigating potential tunnelling tech-
niques that could compromise a military grade network.
• Development of a small IDS. This project involved
developing a libpcap-based application to run on one
of the Raspberry Pi boards. The application monitored
network traffic to identify a SYN flood attack using a
simple window-based statistical analysis.
• Attack on a secure IoT protocol. This project involved
developing a network of IoT devices for environment
analysis (temperature and humidity), and identifying the
encrypted payloads within the traffic (MQTT), which
were then attacked using a block decryption technique.
• Development of an IDS for a full subnet MitM attack.
This project involved developing a stateful IDS using
libpcap to identify spoofed ARP packets.
• Development of a DOS tool that attempts to prevent de-
tection from an IDS. This project involved developing a
RAW sockets application that crafted packets to replicate
valid traffic within the subnet environment.
• Analysis of a DNS amplification attack. This project
involved configuring a vulnerable DNS environment,
executing an attack, and analysing the bandwidth effect
on the network.
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D. STUDENT FEEDBACK
In academic year 2017/18, following the delivery of the
security case project, we carried out an online, five-point,
Likert-type scale survey to gauge student opinion about the
effectiveness of the laboratory configurations. We canvassed
a cohort of 48 students of whom 29 responded. The results of
the survey are discussed briefly below.
• Utility: Students were asked how useful they found the
HILV honeypot for the practical research component
of the module. All students found the honeypot use-
ful, with 89.66% rating the usefulness as very good
or excellent. This result matched our expectations, as
students usually report that they learn better when they
have access to physical equipment.
• Ease of use: Students were asked how easy it was to
configure the HILV honeypot. This question related to
scenarios in which students were provided with a basic
configuration and were required to extend and adapt it to
their own requirements. 98% of students reported that
it was not difficult to configure the honeypot, with the
majority indicating that they found it easy or very easy.
This ease of use can be attributed to the following
factors.
– The base configuration of the honeypot has a fixed
configuration for its router and switch. This allows
students to sign out any of the honeypots from the
loans facility and use it immediately in a ‘plug-and-
play’ fashion for many exercises.
– The students created their own base servers from
a set of images distributed from the laboratory NAS
drive. Following each practical session, the students
retained the SD cards for use at the next session.
The SD cards provided a stateful configuration of
their work.
– The students were able to backup their entire
project using a “dump” (dd) of the SD cards.
• Previous experience and likely future use: Students were
asked if they had used a honeypot earlier in their studies.
Most students (93%, 27/29) had not used a honeypot
before their undergraduate studies and therefore had
no preconception of what to expect. In contrast, when
asked if they would consider using the HILV honeypot
again, the majority (97%, 28/29) of the students indi-
cated that they would use it for further studies.
More extensive and more careful studies are needed to
quantify the pedagogical benefits of our approach but these
preliminary results are an indication of a very positive student
reaction to their experience in our laboratory.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The development of the HILV honeypot environment, and
its integration with the general purpose networks lab and the
LIHV laboratory-based honeypot, has proved successful for
both teaching and research. The cost of the HILV honeypot
has been reduced to such an extent that, rather than the
laboratory supporting a single (LIHV) honeypot, which has
to be reconfigured between sessions, the laboratory can now
support multiple honeypots that are highly configurable and
portable.
As the HILV honeypots are small-scale and low-cost, the
equipment is permanently configured for teaching purposes.
Each HILV honeypot is capable of supporting four students
at a time to work on research-based modules and allows prac-
tical cybersecurity modules to be delivered more effectively.
The integration of the honeypots into a laboratory environ-
ment that supports a wide-range of other technology-focused
modules provides a cost-effective solution to the delivery of
stimulating, practical cybersecurity teaching.
Student numbers have risen sharply for cybersecurity
courses and the use of the honeypots has allowed additional
levels of cybersecurity to be incorporated into existing net-
work courses. This has had a strategic impact on the Uni-
versity since the B.C.S. (British Computing Society) added
cybersecurity as a required part of its accreditation process.
Our aim is to increase the number of HILV honeypots to
accommodate the increasing number of students. The low
cost of the platform makes this an achievable goal. It is also
envisaged that, using this technology, the department will
be able to expand its cybersecurity research by preparing
students for PhD studies in the subject area. It is intended
to seek funding to develop a HIHV honeypot to support
these PhD students. This honeypot will consist of several
large scale servers along with commercial grade switches
and routers and large-scale data capture facilities. Such a
facility will provide an excellent environment for the study
of cybersecurity at PhD level and has the potential to advance
our understanding of the subject significantly.
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